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THE SCOPE OF A CIVIL ACTION*

William Wirt Blume t

A

T common law the maximum scope ( outer boundary) of a civil
action was determined by five unrelated principles or rules:
(I) The plaintiff's statement of claim (declaration) had to agree with
the original (jurisdictional) writ. (2) An action could not be grounded
on two writs, and, ordinarily, one writ could not be in two forms. (3)
Before an action could be tried it had to be reduced to a single issue of
law or fact. ( 4) The courts would not deal with an action to which
there were more than two parties or sets of parties. (5) One judgment
had to be rendered alike for all the plaintiffs against all the defendants
or for all the defendants against all the plaintiffs. The minimum
scope (content) of a civil action at common law was governed by the
law which determined the contents of the original writs. Whatever
was sufficient to constitute the minimum substance of a valid writ was a
sufficient basis for a judgment for the plaintiff. If the plaintiff's claim
did not have this minimum content, judgment for the defendant had
to be rendered.
None of the above principles or rules was followed by the courts
of equity. These courts were willing to deal with more than two
parties or sets of parties and would mould their decrees to fit the needs
of the particular case. They were willing to deal with multiple issues,
and were not limited by jurisdictional writs. The chief limitations on
the maximum scope of the suit in equity were: (I) Lack of jurisdiction due to the existence of adequate remedies at law. (2) Multifariousness. This latter limitation was a matter which rested largely in
the discretion of the court. The minimum scope (content) of the suit
in equity was determined by considerations of equity jurisdiction. The
plaintiff's statement of claim (bill) had to state the substantive elements of a claim over which the court of equity could take jurisdiction.
When, in New York in I 848, the forms of action were abolished
and a statutory civil action was established in the place of actions at
law and suits in equity, the code writers undertook to fix the scope of
the new civil action by reference to a secondary procedural unit called a

* This paper, without footnotes, has been transmitted to the United States Department of State for presentation at the Tenth Chilean General Scientific Congress to
be held at Santiago, early in 1944.
Professor of law, University of Michigan Law School.-Ed.
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"ca1;1se of action." They failed, however, to define this secondary unit. ·
They undertook, also, to set an arbitrary limit on the maximum scope
of the new action. These features of the original New York code,
which have been widely copied, are now recognized as great weaknesses
of the code system.
In the last fifty years the rules which deal with what Professor
Millar happily has called "The Compass of the Cause" have shown
"conspicuous advance." 1 This adyance is clearly reflected in the Rules
of Civil Procedure of the District Courts of the U.nited States, effective
in 1938. It is the purpose of this paper, first, to present a complete
analysis of the concept: scope of a civil action; second, to show the
weaknesses of the codes in dealing with this concept; and, third, to
indicate to what extent these,weaknesses have been remedied by the
new federal rul.es ( I 93 8).

l
AFFIRMATIVE PLEADING SCOPE

A. Minimum A_ffirmative Scope
J'v.!inimum Substance of a Claim
(a) At common law. The English common-law courts, that is the
great central courts, were not given jurisdiction of classes of civil
actions, but of each action individually.2 For a long period executive
discretion was exercised in ·the granting of the writs which conferred
this jurisdiction. Each writ gave the names of the parties and a
statement of the substantive elements of the plaintiff's claim. After
the granting of writs had become a matter of administrative routine,
the courts assumed the function of determining whether the substantive
elements set forth in a particular writ constituted a legal claim in view
of the precedents.8
I.

1
Millar, "Notabilia of American Civil Procedure 1887-1937," 50 HARV, L. REv.
1017 at 1019 (1937).
2 STEPHEN, A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING IN CIVIL AC'J'.IONS, 3d
Am. (Tyler) from 2d London ed., 40 (1924); SHIPMAN, HANDBOOK O:f CoMMONLAw PLEADING, 3d (Ballantine) ed., 17 (1923).
8
Holdsworth writes: "It must be admitted that we know very little of the conditions under which the Chancery clerks issued their writs in the late fourteenth and
fifteenth centuries. It is possible that, in the case of writs, as in the case of the written
pleadings which were emerging in the fifteenth century, the advisers of the parties
framed them, and then did their best to maintain them in Court if their validity were
disputed; so that, when the Chancery sealed these writs, they only acted ministerially,
and left the validity of the writ wholly to the Courts." Holdsworth, note, 47 L. Q. REv.
334 at 335-336 (1931). "Judges eventually can quash a new writ." GoEBEL, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS I 29 ( I 93 7),

--
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A statement of claim (declaration) was merely an elaboration of
the original (jurisdictional) writ-a statement of the substantive
elements of the claim plus certain particulars.4
After the practice of issuing original writs was discontinued, the
courts presumed that the substantive elements of a claim set forth in a
particular declaration were the same as those supposedly set forth in a
supposed writ.5 If the substantive elements pleaded were not such as
would have constituted a good writ, the declaration was insufficient in
law.
( b) In equity. As equity jurisdiction was not conferred by original
(jurisdictional) writs, it was in· one sense unlimited. The courts, however, by declining jurisdiction of some claims and· taking jurisdiction
of others, gradually established certain definite "heads" of equity jurisdiction. "It is obvious," remarked Story, "that every Bill must have
for its object one or more of the grounds, upon which the jurisdiction
of a Court of Equity is founded." 6 "An original Bill," according to
the same authority, is "founded upon some right claimed by the party
plaintiff, in opposition to some right claimed, or wrong done, by the
party defendant." 7
4
STEPHEN, PLEADING, 3d Am. ed., 65, 369 (1924). In the days of oral pleading
one of the first steps in an action was the reading aloud of the original (jurisdictional)
writ. 6 BRACToN, DE LEGU~us ET CoNSUETUDINJBus, Twiss ed., f. 413 (1883). Then
came an oral statement of claim-the plaintiff's declaration. Id., f. 435b. According to
Bracton, an exception was available to the defendant if the plaintiff stated "nothing at
all" or failed to show by what right he claimed; also, if he "receded from his writ''
so that his declaration was not "consonant" thereto. Id., f. 435b. In 1590 a judgment
was reversed because "the writ was quare clausum fregit, and the count was clattsa
fregit." Edwards v. Watkin, Cro. Eliz. 185, 78 Eng. Rep. 441 (1590). In an action
of detinue decided three years later "The writ was ad valentiam twenty pounds; the
declaration ad valentiam forty pounds.-lt was adjudged error, and the judgment
reversed." Young v. Watson, Cro. Eliz. 308, 78 Eng. Rep. 559 (1593). By the time
Stephen wrote in the 182o's objections on the ground of variance were rarely possible.
STEPHEN, supra, 369-370. The result of the old rules against variance was still felt,
however, "for its long and ancient observance had fixed the frame and language of the
declaration in conformity with the original writ in each form of action." Id. 370. It
thus appears that the writ, "by which the right of action ought to be set forth and
expounded," Bracton, supra, f. 413, determined the minimum substance of the
plaintiff's claim. "The development of writ measured the development of rights."
SUNDERLAND, CASES ON COMMON LAW PLEADING, 2d ed., 3 (1932). "The writ
created the right, and conformity to some writ was the test of a prima facie right to sue."
Id. 4. "The scheme of 'original writs'," said Maitland, "is the very scheleton of the
Corpus Juris." Maitland, "The History of the Register of Original Writs," 3 HARV.
L. REv. 97 (1889) reprinted in, 2 MAITLAND, CoLLECTED PAPERS IIO (19u).
6
Cf. STEPHEN, PLEADING, 3d Am. ed., 88 (1924).
6
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY PLEADINGS, § 9 (1838).
7
Id., § 23.
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(c) Under the' codes. A civil action, as defined by the original
New York code (1848), "is a regular judicial proceeding, in which a
party prosecutes another party, for the enforcement or protection of a
right, [or] the redress or prevention of a wrong." 8 Elsewhere the
code declared:
"The distinction between actions at law and suits in equity,
and the forms of all such actions and suits heretofore existing,
are abolished; and, there shall be in this state, hereafter, but one
, form of action, for the enforcement or protection of private rights
and the redress or prevention of private wrongs, which shall be ·
denominated a civil action." 9
These definitions of a civil action have been widely copied, and will
be found today in the statutes of most code states.10
In addition to the "civil action," the original New York code, and
the codes patterned after it, established a secondary unit of procedure
called. a ','cause of action." If the plaintiff is to have judgment he
must plead facts. sufficient to constitute a "cause of action." 11 It was
the intention of the code writers that the primary unit called a "civil
action" would be composed of one or more secondary units called
"causes of action." This scheme has proved unsuccessful largely because the codes failed to fix the maximum scope of the secondary unit.
While experiencing great difficulties in attempting to determine •
the maximum scope of a "cause of action," the courts have been able
to determine the minimum scope with relatively little trouble. The
minimum scope of the secondary unit is held to coincide with the
minimum scope of the primary unit. The latter, as defined by the
codes, is a proceeding "for the enforcement or protection of a right"
or "the redress or prevention of a wrong."
The definition of "cause of action" most widely accepted by the
courts is that given by Pomeroy in his well-known work on Code
Remedies:
" ... Every judicial action must therefore involve the following elements: a primary right possessed by the plaintiff, and a corresponding primary duty devolving upon the defendant; a delict
or wrong done by the defendant which consisted in a breach of
sue~ primary right and duty; a remedial right in favor of the
8
9

N.Y. Laws (1848), c. 379, § 2 (cited hereafter as "N.Y. Code").
Id.,§ 62.

10 PHILLIPs,_AN EXPOSITION OF THE PRINCIPL~s OF CoDE PLEADING,

man) ed., § 172 (1932); BANCROFT,
11
N. Y. Code (1848), § 127.

CoDE PRACTICE AND REMEDIES,

2d (Viessel-

§ 77a (1927).
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plaintiff, and a remedial duty resting on the defendant springing
from this delict, and finally the remedy or relief it.self. Every
action, however complicated or however simple, must contain
these essential elements. Of these elements, the primary right
and duty and the delict or wrong combined constitute the cause
of action in the legal sense of the term, and as it is used in the
codes of the several states." 12
This definition is accurate in so far as it fixes the minimum scope of
the code "cause of action," but is defective in that it. fails to determine,
or even mention, the maximum scope of the secondary unit.
The minimum substance of a "cause of action" is a single invasion
of ( or threat to invade) a single right. But suppose two or more
rights have been invaded by the same act? Or a single right has been
invaded more than once? In their failure to provide for these situations
we find one of the greatest weaknesses of the code.
(d) Under the federal rules. Although fully aware of the difficulties caused by the failure of the codes to define "cause of action,"
the draftsmen of the new federal rules (1938) deliberately repeated
the earlier mistake.18 By substituting the word "claim" for the phrase
"cause of action" they hoped to free the rules from the conflicting
opinions which had interpreted the codes,14 but must have realized
that they were sowing the seeds of further conflict.
As in the case of the codes, the courts will have little trouble in
fixing the minimum substance of the secondary unit now called a
"claim." The difficulty will come at the other extreme. How much
PoMERoY, CoDE REMEDIES, 5th ed., § 347 (1929).
It is assumed that the omission of any definition of the term "claim" was
deliberate and not due to oversight. This assumption is based on the fact that the draftsman of the rules (Dean, now Judge, Charles E. Clark) had, for a number of years,
advocated what he considered to be a proper definition of the code "cause of action"
and was fully aware of the difficulties which had arisen from the lack of an adequate
definition of that term. See CLARK, HANDBOOK OF CoDE PLEADING 75 (1928).
14
Professor James W. Moore, who assisted in drafting the rules, says: ''Nowhere
in the Rules is the term 'cause of action' used. This can only mean that the draftsmen, by the use of the phrase 'claim' or 'claim for relief,' hoped that such different
expressions in lieu of 'cause of action' would give the courta freedom to escape from the
morass of decisions concerning a cause of action; and would adopt a pragmatic treatment of what we may for convenience still refer to as a cause of action." 1 MooRE,
FEDERAL PRAcnc~ 145 (1938). The "pragmatic treatment" referred to was the view
advocated by Judge Clark. From this statement it appears that the term "claim" was
left undefined so that the "pragmatic view" might be urged upon the courts. Why the
"pragmatic view" was not stated in the rules in the form of a definition does not appear. Numerous law review articles dealing with the troublesome "cause of action"
are cited by MooRE, id.
12

18
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more than the minimum 'can we have and still have a single claim?
If the pla~ntift recovers on a minimum and brings a second action for
1
the excess, can he be met with the plea that he has split a claim?

Attempt to State a Claim
For an action to have any real affirmative scope it is necessary that
at least one legally sufficient claim be stated. It must be noted, however, that an attempt to state a claim, if the attempt goes far enough
to challenge the attention of the court, will invoke the jurisdiction of
the court. 15 Where a claim is stated, or a sufficient attempt is made, the
court may render judgment whether the defendant pleads or not. A
judgment rendered for the plaintiff on a legally insufficient statement
of claim is erroneous; but if the attempt is sufficient the judgment is
not void.16
B. Maximum Affirmative Scope
2.

r. Multiple Claims
(a) J oinder of Plaintiffs
(i) At common law. The term, "joinder of plaintiffs" has two
distinct meanings. (a) When two or more persons are jointly interested in a claim they must, ordinarily, join as plaintiffs in any action
brought to enforce the claim. This is j oinder of plaintiffs. (b) When
two or more persons, each having a claim against another person, join
their claims in one action, the joinder is, in reality, "joinder of claims,"
but is also called "joinder of plaintiffs." Joinder of the first type,
which was recognized at common law, does not affect, at least directly,
the scope of an action. Joinder of the second.type does affect the scope
of an action, but was not recognized at common law.
(ii) In equity. Although joinder of the second type mentioned
above was recognized in equity, the extent of the joinder was limited
by the pri,nciple' which condemned multifariousness. According to
Story, this principle "applies to an improper joinder of plaintiffs, who
claim no common interest, but assert distinct and several claims." 17
If, however, the claims of the several plaintiffs were so related as to
indicate that'common questions of law or fact would be involved, their
joinder might be allowed. The potential scope of an action brought
by joined plaintiffs of type two is dearly broader than the potential
15

Welch v. Fecht,

16

Id.

67 Qkla. 275, 171· P. 130 (1918).
36 YALE L. J. 549 (1937).
17
STORY, EQUITY PLEADINGS,§ 279 (1838). See CLEPHANE,
LAW OF EQUITY PLEADING AND PRACTICE 59 (1926).
Also see comment,

HANDBOOK ON THE
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scope of an action brought by one of the plaintiffs alone. But if all thequestions presented to the court should turn out to be common to all
the claims, the actual scope of the trial would be the same. With
respect to the joinder of plaintiffs the maximum potential scope of a
suit in equity was definitely limited by the rule against permitting
"several plaintiffs to demand by one bill, several matters, perfectly
distinct and unconnected, against one defendant." 18 Beyond this there
was no scope-limiting rule, the matter of joinder being left to the
discretion of the court to be exercised in light of equity's "abhorrence"
of unnecessary suits.
(iii) Under the codes. The original New York code (r848) provided that all persons having "an interest in the subject of the action,
and in obtaining the relief demanded" might join as plaintiffs.19 This
section, which appears in most of the present codes,2° permits plaintiffs
having separate claims to join them, but only when they have an interest in "the subject of the action" and in "the relief demanded." The
quoted phrases fix the maximum potential scope of an action with
respect to the joinder of plaintiffs, but in language which has been
difficult, if not impossible, to apply. Due to the uncertainty of these
scope-limiting phrases the courts have been inclined to hold; with
respect to the joinder of plaintiffs, that the scope of an action for legal
relief is the same as it was before the code, and that of an action for
relief in equity is as limited as, and probably more limited than, it w~s
before. With the adoption of the codes the discretion formerly exercised by the courts of equity disappeared.
(iv) Under the federal rules. The federal rules (r938) provide:
"All persons may join in one action as plaintiffs if they assert any
right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative in respect of or
arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions
or occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all of
them will arise in the action." 21 Two tests must be met: (a) The
claims joined must be "in respect of" or "arise out of" the same
transaction, etc. (b) It must appear that some question of law or fact
common to all of them will arise. While these requirements definitely
limit the potential scope of any action in so far as j oinder of plaintiffs
18

Fellows v. Fellows, 4 Cow. (N. Y.) 682 at 700 (1825).
N. Y. Code (1848), § 97.
2
° CLARK, CooE PLEADING, 252 (1928); PHILLIPS, CoDE PLEADING, 2d ed., §
251 (1932).
21
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1938), Rule 20 (a) (hereafter cited as
"Federal Rules"). See 2 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, c. 20 (1938).
10
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is concerned, they expand the scope over that allowed at common law.
The scope provided is much the same as that allowed in equity before
the codes. It will be noted that it is enough if "any" question of law
or fact will be common to all the claims. The rules further provide
that the court, "in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice,"
may order separate trials. 22 This means that the court, in its discretion,
may narrow the scope of an action, but may not expand it beyond the
maximum limits fixed by the rules.

(b) Joinder of Defendants
(i) At common law. A person having several claims, each against
a different person, could not join them in one action at common law.
He could, however, join as defendants persons who were jointly liable.
If such persons were sued jointly and all joined in the same defenses,
the actual scope of the action was not affected by the joinder. But 'since
these defendants could defend separately, the potential affirmative .
scop~, in so far as it was determined by the defendants' pleadings, was
multiplied by the number of defendants joined.
(ii) In equity. The principle which condemned multifariousness
led the courts of equity to hold that a plaintiff could not demand "several matters of distinct natures against several defendants in the same
Bill." 28 If, however, questions common to all the claims were reasonably certain to arise, joinder might 'be permitted, this being a
matter within the discretion of the court. With respect to the joinder
of defendants, the rules limiting the scope of the suit were much the
- same as where joinder of plaintiffs was involved;
(iii) Under the codes. The original New York code (1848) provided that any person might be made a party defendant, who had "an
interest in the controversy, adverse to th.e plaintiff." 24 Later, this was
amended by adding: "or who is a necessary party to- the complete
determination or settlement of the question involved therein." 25 These
provisions were intended to :fix the maximum scope of an action in
respect to joinder of defendants, b~t were so vague that the courts
found it necessary to follow the precedents of the o_lder systems.26
22

Federal Rule 42 (b). See 3 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, § 42.02 (1938).
STORY, EQUITY PLEADINGS,§ 271 (1838): See CLEPHANE, EQUITY PLEADING
AND PRACTICE 61 (1926).
,
24
N. Y. Code (1848), § 98.
25
ld., as amended by N. Y. Laws (1849), c. 438, § II8.•
26
CLARK, CoDE PLEADING 265 (1928). In this connection Judge, then Professor, Clark observed: "It seems that the possible scope of a single case [is] more or less
delimited by the extent of, the rules within which plaintiffs may be joined; and courts
28

•
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(iv) Under the federal rules. "All persons may be joined in one
action as defendaats if there is asserted against them jointly, severally,
or in the alternative, any right to relief in respect of or arising out of
the same transaction, occurrence, or series of tr?,nsactions or occurrences
if any question of law or fact common to all of them will arise in the
action." 21 The scope-limiting provisions of this rule are the same as
those found in the federal rule, discussed above, which governs the
joinder of plaintiffs.
( c) J oinder of Claims
(i) At common law., Joinder of claims means the joinder in one
action of two or more claims by one plaintiff (or joint plaintiffs)
against one defendant (or joint defendants). At common law an
original (jurisdictional) writ might authorize the prosecution of one
claim, or it might, by enlarging a claim in point of sums and quantities,
authorize the joining of any number of claims in one action. 28 On the
other hand, "It was impossible," as stated by Evans, "that one action
could be grounded on two writs, or that one writ could be in two
forms; consequently there could be no joinder of counts, sounding, as
the phrase is, in two different forms of action." 20 It must be noted,
however, that this rule was subject to two exceptions: Debt could be
joined with detinue, and case with trover. Aside from these two instances of double writs, each writ was limited to one form of action.
As a result of this development we find that any number of claims of
the same form of action could be joined in one action, but claims of
different forms of action could not be joined, except debt with detinue,
and case with trover. As long as the claims joined were of the same
form of action there was no rule which fixed the maximum scope of an
action in respect to joinder of claims, and the courts were without
power to limit the scope in their discretion. When it came to joining
claims of different forms, the maximum scope was one form, except
as already indicated above.
(ii) In equity. Some courts of equity took the position that unrelated claims between the same parties could not be joined, holding
that a common question was necessary. Other courts permitted free
joinder of claims, subject to the court's control. According to the one
naturally fall into the practice of setting a limit to the joinder of defendants corresponding roughly to that set for plaintiffs."
27
Federal Rule 20 (a). See 2 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, c. 20 (1938).
28
Blume, "A Rational Theory for Joinder of Causes of Action and Defenses, and
for the Use of Counterclaims," 26 ·M1cH. L. REv. I at 4 (1927).
29
EVANS, PLEADING IN C1v1L ACTIONS, 2d ed., 94 (1886).

266
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view, the scope of a suit was limited by the rule which prohibited
joinder of unrelated claims. According to the other view, the only
limitation of scope in respect to joinder of claims was the discretion of
the court.
(iii) Under the codes. The original New York code (r848) provided that a plaintiff might unite in one complaint against one defendant any number of claims belonging to ariy one of seven classes
of claims. As long as the claims belonged to one class the potential
scope of the action in this respect was unlimited, the court having no
power to order separate trials. From the viewpoint of joining claims
of different classes, the maximum scope was one class. In I 852 a new
class was added: Claims may be joined "where they all arise out of
the same transaction, or transactions connected with the same subject
of the action." 80 This class cut across the other seven classes and fixed
the maxin,mm scope of an action in respect to the· joinder of claims
belonging to different classes of the original classification. The scopelimiting phrases used in the amendment have been difficult to interpret
and have led to great uncertainty as to the exact location of the outer
boundary of an action. In a few code states joined claims must be
consistent.81
In one direction, however, the codes of most of the states made a
significant advance. By abolishing the "distinctions between actions at
law and suits in equity, and the forms of all such actions and suits,"
they opened the way for joining claims in equity with claims at law.
The New York code, as amended in r852, expressly provided that a
plaintiff might "unite" claims, otherwise joinable,_ "whether they be
- such as have been heretofore denominated legal or equitable, or
both." 32 This possibility greatly increased the potential maximum
scope of the civil action.
(iv) Under the federal rules. The federal rules (r938) authorize
a plaintiff to join in one action "as many claims either legal or equitable
or both al, he may have against an opposing party," 33 subject to the
power of the court to order separate trials. While the potential maximum scope of an action in respect to joinder of claims between the
same parties is unlimited by rule, the actual scope .may be limited by
30

N. Y. Laws (1852), c. 392, § 167, amending N. Y. Code (1848), § 143.

CLARK, CoDE PLEADING 305 (1928); PHILLIPS, CoDE PLEADING, 2d ed., §
316 (1932).
32
N. Y. Laws (1852), c. 392, § 167.
88 Federal Rule 18 (a). See 2 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, §§ 18.01, 18.02
31

(1938).

1 943

J

ScoPE OF A CIVIL AcTION

the court in "furtherance of convenience and to avoid prejudice." 34
The plaintiff is permitted, but not required, to join as many claims as
he may have against the defendant. The maximum scope is authorized,
not compelled.
( d) Counterclaims '

(i) At common law. No true counterclaim was developed under
the common law. Recoupment was a defense. Setoff was introduced
by statute. Both, however, affected the scope of actions and should be
considered at this point. An act of Parliament passed in 1729 provided
"that where there are mutual debts between the plaintiff and defendant
... one debt may be set against the other." 85 Under the common law
the plaintiff could include in one form of action as many claims of
debt as he had against the defendant. When sued for a debt, the
defendant could, under the statute, set up as many claims of debt as
he had against the plaintiff. The effect of the statute was to double
the potential maximum scope of actions to recover debts. Recoupment
was developed so as to permit a defendant to set up as a defense any
claim he might have against the plaintiff arising out of the transaction
which gave rise to the plaintiff's claim. Any kind of claim at law
could be used as recoupment against any kind of claim so lo~g as
the scope-limiting requirement that they arise out of the same transaction was observed.
(ii) In equity. A defendant in a suit in equity was permitted to
file a cross bill against the plaintiff, or against a codefendant, or both,
"touching the matters in question in the original Bill." 86 In other
words, a cross bill "should not introduce new and distinct matters, not
embraced in the original suit." 37
(iii) Under the codes. The original New York code (1848)
made no provision for counterclaims. A section added in l 852 authorized the defendant to set up against the plaintiff "a cause of action
arising out of the contract or transaction set forth in the complaint." 88
Another clause added at the same time provided that in an action
"arising on contract" the defendant might counterclaim "any other
cause of action arising also on contract." 89 The scope-limiting provi34

Federal Rule 42 (b) .
2 Geo. II., c. 22, § 13 (1729).
36 STORY, EQUITY PLEADINGS, § 389 (1838). See
PiMcncE 308 (1926).
87 STORY, EQUITY PLEADINGS, §,4-01 (1838).
88
N. Y. Laws (1852), c. 392, § 150.
85

AND

30

Id.

CLEPHANE, EQUITY PLEADING

268

1
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sions of these sections were suggested by the rules which governed
recoupment and setoff under the earlier practice.. In actions on contracts, code counterclaims may .be used without limit provided that
they are also on contracts. The use- of other code counterclaims is
limited by the-·requirement that they must arise "out of the contr~ct
or transaction set forth in the complaint."
,(iv) Under the federal rules. The federal rules (1938) permit
all claims against the plaintiff to be used as counterclaims,40 and require
that claims arising "out of the transaction or occurrence that is the
subject matter of the opposing party's claim" be so used.41 In "furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice" the court may order
that any counterclaim be tried separately. It thus appears that the
potential maximum scope of an action, with respect to counterclaims
is no.t fixed in advance by rules. Any limitation on scope is a P1atter
for the court in a particular case. The compulsory counterclaim is
compulsory in the sense that if it is not set up in the plaintiff's action
it cannot be used later. The effect of this rule is to bring all counterclaims which "arise out of the transaction or occurrence that is the
subject matter of the opposing party's claim," within the scope of the
action whether pleaded or not. If not pleaded they are not within
the scope of the trial -and cannot be proved, but are within the scope
of th~ judgment and become res judicata.

( e) Cross Claims against. Coparties
Cross claims agai~st coparties were not used at common law. -In
equity they were limited to "matters in question in the original Bill." 42
Under the few codes which provide for them, they must arise out of
the "facts" set forth in the original complaint.43 Under the federal
rules ( 1938):
"A pleading may state as cross-claim any claim by one party
against a co-party arising out of the transaction or occurrence that
is the subject matter either of the original action or of a counterclaim therein." 44

°

4 Federal Rule 13 (b) ("Permissive Counterclaims"). See I MooRE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE, § 13.03 (1938).
41 federal Rule 13 (a) ("Compulsory Counterclaim,s''). See I MooRE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE,§ 13.02 (1938).
42 STORY, EQUITY PLEADINGS, § 389 (1838). See CLEPHANE, EQUITY PLEADING
AND PRACTICE 308 (1926).
,
43 CLARK, CoDE PLEADING 471 (1928). See PHILLIPS, CoDE PLEADING, 2d ed.,
§ 379 (1932).
,
44 Federal Rule 13 (g). -see l MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, § 13.08 (1938).

1 943

J

SCOPE OF A CIVIL ACTION

These provisions for cross claims increase the potential maximum
scope of an action over what it was. at common law, subject to the
scope-limiting requirement that cross claims must arise out of the
"facts," "transaction," or "occurrence" already involved in the action.

(t) Claims against Third Persons
The federal rules ( r 93 8) 45 and the statutes of some states 46 authorize a defendant ( or a plaintiff when a counterclaim is asserted against
him) to bring in as a third-party a person "who is or may be liable
to him or to the plaintiff for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against
him." This extension of the potential maximum scope of an action is
limited by the requirement that the claims against the third party be
directly related to the claim asserted by the plaintiff.

(g) Claims of Intervenors
The broader type of intervention statute permits a person to intervene who has "an interest in the matter in litigation." 47 Under the
federal rules (1938) a person may be permitted to intervene when his
"claim" and "the main action" have "a question of law or fact in
common." 48 Although the possibility of intervention increases the
potential maximum scope of an action beyond what it would be otherwise, the rules which provide thaf claims of intervenors must show
"an interest in the matter in litigation" or must present a common
question of law or fact put a definite limit on the scope in this respect.
In actions in rem claimants are warned to intervene/9 In representative suits brought for the benefit of persons having separate claims,
the persons represented may, and probably must, intervene.50 In interpleader the parties interpleaded are required to make claims or lose
45

Federal Rule 14. See I MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, c. 14 (1938).
CLARK, CoDE PLEADING 284 (1928).
47
Id. 288. See PHILLIPS, CoDE PLEADING, 2d ed., § 262 (1932).
48
Federal Rule 24 (b). See 2 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, c. 24 (1938).
49
HUGHES, ADMIRALTY, 2d ed., 402 (1920). When an owner takes steps to defend seized property "he comes in rather as claimant or intervenor than as defendant."
Id. The process issued warns all persons interested "to appear, and interpose their
claims." Id. 406.
50
See Blume, "The 'Common Questions' Principle in the Code Provision for Representative Suits," 30 MICH. L. REV. 878 at 898 (1932). In Stevens v. Brooks, 22
Wis. 695 (1866), the court said: "The persons not named in such cases are not parties
to the suit. • •• They are so far before the court that if they neglect, after a reasonable
notice to them for that purpose, to come in under the judgment and establish their
claims, the court will protect the defendants and parties named from any further
litigition."
46
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them. 51- Most or all of these claims are within the scope of the action
whether pleaded or not in the sense that they are concluded by the
judgment.
2. Affirmative Defenses

(a) At Common Law
(i) In abatement. Under the common-law rule which allowed
only one defense to one claim a defendant had to choose whether he
would plead in abatement or in bar. An affirmative defense in abate~
ment was one which alleged that the plaintiff's action had been brought
at a wrong time or place, or in a wrong manner. If the plaintiff denied
the truth of this defense and the jury found for the plaintiff, the
defendant lost the case on its merits as he was never allowed to plead
over and defend on the merits. 52 An affirmative defense in abatement
expanded the scope of the action by bringing before the court matters
not contained in the plaintiff's statement of claim.
(ii) In bar. An affirmative defense in bar is one which in effect
alleges that although what the pla,intiff says is true, here is new matter
which under the law bars his claim. Prior to I 70 5 58 an affirmative
defense expanded the affirmative scope of the action but did not increase the -pot~ntial number of issues. _After the statute of I 70 5 a de- ·
fondant might deny the plaintiff's claim and also plead one or more
affirmative defenses in bar, with leave of the cour,t. Except for the
discretion which the court could exercise in granting leave, there was,
after I 70 5, no limit on the number of new matters in bar which could
be brought in by the way of defense. The statute did not, however,
authorize the pleading of defenses in abatement and in bar at the same
- time. If the two were filed together the defense in abatement was considered waived. 04
(b) 'In Equity
(i) Plea. An affirmative plea in equity set forth some matter not
apparent on the face of the bill "material to delay, dismiss, or bar the
Bill." 55 /i.s the object of a plea was to limit the trial to a single issue
or poin~~ it could not, as a general rule, be double, that is, contain more
51
McNamara v. Provident Life Assur. Soc., (C. C. A. 5th, 1902) II4 F. 910.
i;z SHIPMAN, PLEADING, 3d ed., 402 (1923); O'DONNELL, PROCEDURE AND
FORMS: COMMON-LAW PLEADING 194 (1934).
58
Statute of 4 Anne, c. 16 (1705).
54
SHIPMAN, PLEADING, 3d ed., 284 (1923); O'DoNNELL, CoMMoN-LAw PLEADING 182 (1934).
55 STORY; EQUITY PLEADlNGs, § 661 (1838). See CLEPHANE, EQUITY :{'LEADING
AND PRACTICE 237 (1926).
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than one defense. 56 Defenses in abatement and in bar could not be
joined.57
(ii) Answer. By answer in equity a defendant could set forth as
many affirmative defenses in bar as he had, subject to a requirement
that joined defenses be consistent.58 Consistency was required because
the answer in equity was under· oath and served as a deposition as
well as a pleading.

(c) Under the Codes
The original New York code (r848) provided: "The defendant
may set forth in his answer, as many grounds of defense as he shall
have." 59 In addition to allowing any number of defenses without leave
of court, this provision extended the potential affirmative scope of civil
actions by allowing the joinder of legal and equitable defenses, and the
pleading of defenses in abatement along with defenses in bar. In some
states joined defenses must be consistent. 60 In a few, defenses in abatement and in bar cannot be joined.61

( d) Under the Federal Rules
Under the federal rules (r938) a party may state "as many
separate ... defenses as he has regardless of consistency and whether
based on legal or equitable grounds or both." 62 Defenses in abatement
• and in bar may be pleaded together in the same answer. 68 In so far as
affirmative defenses are concerned, all the older rules of scope-limitation have disappeared.

3. Affimative Replies
(a) At common law. At common law the plaintiff was never allowed more than one reply (replication) to one defense. 6 ~ If he denied
the defense an issue was formed. If he put in an affirmative reply,
56

STORY, EQUITY PLEADINGS,§ 653 (1838); CLEPHANE, EQUITY PLEADING AND
PRACTICE 237 (1926).
57
•
STORY, EQUITY PLEADINGS, § 708 (1838).
58
Jesus College v. Gibbs, 1 Y. & C. Exch. 145 at 147, 160 Eng. Rep. 59 (1835).
59
N. Y. Code (1848), § 129.
6
° CLARK, CoDE PLEADING 432 (1928); PHILLIPS, CoDE PLEADING, 2d ed., §§
363-368 (1932).
61
CLARK, CoDE PLEADING 411 ( 1928); PHILLIPS, CoDE PLEADING, 2d ed., §
362 (1932).
62
Federal Rule 8 (e) (2). See I MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE,§ 8.12 {1938).
63
See Form No. 20.
64
STEPHEN, PLEADING, 3d Am. ed., 265 ( 1924); SHIPMAN, PLEADING, 3d ed.,
367 (1923).
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confessing the defense, the-issue was postponed. Ordinarily there could
be only one issue with respect to one defense. 65 To prevent the introduction of a new claifi! at the stage of the reply, the courts enforced a
rule which prohibited any departure from the claim set up in the
declaration. 66
( b) In equity. Although used in equity at one- time, affirmative
replies were discontinued, leaving in use only a "general replication"
which was "a general denial of the truth of the defendant's plea or
answer." 67
(c) Under the codes. The original New York Code (1848) provided that a plaintiff in his reply might deny "each alregation" of an
affirmative defense and allege in avoidance '~any new matter not inconsistent with the complaint." 68 When Parliament in 1705 allowed
the defendant to plead an unlimited number of defenses to one claim,
with leave of the court, it took a long step toward eradicating the
common-law notion that the outer boundaries of actions should' be
fixed by rules. In allowing an unlimited number of replies to one
defense, the code writers took another long step in the same direction.
(d) Under the federal rules. Replies to defenses are not allowed
under the federal rules (1938) unless specially ordered by the court. 69
The number of replies which may be made to one defense is, therefore,
not a matter of rule, -but a matter within the discretion of the court in
the particular case.

II
TRIAL ScoPE

A. Issues Formed By Pleadings
Scope Determination
According to the principle of "party-presentation," which long has
characterized Anglo-American civil procedure, "the scope and content
of the judicial _controversy are to be defined by the parties." 70 Scopel.

65
A general replication known as "the traverse de injuria" could be used in a few
situations. STEPHEN, PLEADINGS, 3d Am. ed., 179 (1924); SHIPMAN, PLEADING, 3d
ed., 367 (1923).
•
66
STEPHEN, PLEADING, 3d Am. ed., 354 (1924); SHIPMAN, PLEADING, 3d ed.,
376 (1923).
67
STORY, EQUITY PLEADINGS,§ 878 (1838). See CLEPHANE, EQUITY PLEADING
AND PRACTICE 328 ( l 926).
68
N. Y. Code (1848), § 131.
69
Federal Rule 7 (a).
70
Millar, "The Formative Principles of Civil Procedure;• 18 ILL. L. REv. 1 at 9
{ I 92 3), reprinted ' MILLAR, A H !STORY OF CONTINENTAL C1viL PROCEDURE I I
(1927).
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determination is accomplished, in the first instance, by written statements of claim and defense made in advance of trial. Once the "scope
and content" of the ,action have been defined by the parties, this
scope-determination governs the trial and also the appeal. It is a fixed
rule that no claim or defense not included in the scope-determination
can be proved on the trial, unless the point is waived or the court
allows the scope-determination to be amended. A matter outside the
scope of the trial is, of course, outside the scope of review.

A Single Issue
(a) At common law. Stephen, in his classic -work on pleading,
states that pleadings in common-law actions "are so conducted as always
to evolve some question, either of fact or law, disputed between the
parties, and mutually proposed and accepted by them as the subject
for decision, and the question so produced is called the issue."11 According to Stephen, the formation of "an issue" is the "main object" of
common-law pleading, and is peculiar to that system.12 As Holdsworth
sees it, "the settlement by the debate of the parties in court of the
issue to be tried" is "the fundamental peculiarity of the English system of pleading." 73
·
Where the plaintiff stated, or attempted to state, a single claim,
a single issue of law could be formed by challenging the statement as
insufficient in law. A siqgle• issue of fact could be formed by denying
the truth of some one element of the claim. Subject to rules discussed
below ,14 a decision of either issue settled the entire action. If the
plaintiff lost on either issue, judgment went for the defendant as a
plaintiff could not have judgment if his claim was legally insufficient
or if a necessary part of it was factually untrue. If the defendant lost
on either issue, judgment went for the plaintiff; in the case of the issue
of la~ because the plaintiff's claim was legally sufficient and the defendant had not denied the facts; in the case of the issue of fact, because
all elements of the plaintiff's claim except one had been admitted to be
factually true, and the element denied had been found to be true. If,
instead of denying, the defendant alleged new matter as a defense, he
tacitly admitted the truth of all matters properly· pleaded by the
plaintiff as the elements of his claim. As no issue was formed by such
2.

71
STEPHEN, PLEADING, 3d Am. ed., 147-148 (1924). Other definitions of "the
issue" will be found id., Appendix, xl, note 39.
121d. 148.
73
3 HoLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW, 3d ed., 632 (1923).
74
Subdivision II, C, "Questions not Waived," p. 278, infra.
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a defense, the plaintiff was required to reply. If new matter should be
set up in the reply, a rejoinder was necessary, and so on until ·a party
raised either an issue of law or an issue of fact. At whatever stage the
issue was raised, this one issue settled the entire case. All affirmative
matters of claim, defense, reply, etc., not met by denials were ad~
mitted and need not be proved. The si~gle issue was possible only when
the plaintiff stated one claim, the defendant one affirmative defense,
the plaintiff one affirmative reply, etc., for if there were more lines of
pleading than one, an issue had to terminate each line.
(b) In equity. In equity a defendant was expected to make a full
and complete answer to the plaintiff's statement of claim. He could,
however, demur on the ground that the statement (bill) "contains not
any matter of equity," and thus raise an issue of law.7~ After a long
period of doubt, it was held that he might, also, meet the statement of
claim by a single negative plea.76 After this development it was possible
for the parties to a ·suit in equity to limit the suit to a single issue of
law or of fact, much the same as at common law.
(c) Under the codes. The original New York code (1848) provided that a defendant might demur on one or more grounds,77 and
might answer by making a "specific denial" of "each allegation" of the
complaint "controverted" by him. 78 It provided, further, that a
plaintiff might deny "each, allegation" of an affirmative defense. 79
These provisions, found in most if not all of tf!e codes today, have continued in force the common-law scheme of allowing the parties by their
pleadings to limit any action involving a single claim to a single issue of
law or of fact.
(d) Under the federal rules. The federal rules (1938) provide
that a defendant may move to dismiss on certain grounds. 80 Such a
motion based on one ground may raise a single issue of law. The rules
further proyide that, a party shall "admit or deny the averments upon
which the adverse party relies." 81 Coupled with this provision is one
which declares that averments not denied are "admitted." 82 Where all
elements of a claim except one are admitted ( whether expressly or
tacitly) and that one is explicitly denied, the action is limited to a single
issue of fact.
75 STORY,

EQmn;

PLEADINGS,

§§ 453, 455, note 3 (1838)·;

PLEADING AND PRACTICE 191 (1926).
76 STORY, EQUITY PLEADINGS,

§ 668 (1838);

AND PRACTICE 262
77 N. Y. Code

Id., § 128.
10 Id., ·§ 13 I.
78

(1926).
(1848), § 122.

8

CLEPHANE,

°Federal Rule

CLEPHANE,

EQUITY

12 (b).
Federal Rule 8 (b).
82
Federal Rule 8 (d).
81

EQUITY

PLEADING
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3. Multiple Issues
(a) At common law. Except in two situations', n'oted below, the
rules of common-law pleading required that every action be reduced
to one issue of law or of fact. A single issue was the maximum as well
as the minimum trial scope of a civil action in so far as the pleadings
determined the scope.
A single issue of fact was enforced by the rules which prohibited
"duplicity." To any one claim the defendant was allowed only one
defense. 83 If this defense was a denial of the truth of one of the matters
alleged by the plaintiff, the only issue raised by the pleadings was this
single question of fact. If, instead of denying, the defendant pleaded
an affirmative defense, the plaintiff was required to reply. Under the
rules against duplicity a reply was limited to one denial or one new
matter of avoidance.84 If new matter was set up in the reply calling for
a rejoinder, the rejoinder was limited to one denial or one new matter
of avoidance, and so on until issue was reached. The fact that no pleading could be double meant that only one line of pleading was formed.
Instead of denying the truth of some matter alleged by the opposite
party or setting up new matter in avoidance, a party could allege that
his opponent's claim, defense, reply, etc., was "insufficient in law," thus
raising an issue of law. He could not, however, raise an issue of fact
and an issue of law: at the same time with respect to the same matter. 85
If an issue of law was raised at any stage, the entire action was submitted to the court on this single issue. The scheme contemplated a
single line of pleading terminated either by an issue of fact or by an
issue of law.
One exceptional situation was presented when a plaintiff joined
two or more claims in one action. In this situation the defendant was
allowed to plead a separate defense to each claim.86 This meant that,
instead of only one line of pleading, there might be as many lines as
there were claims, and, as each line terminated in an issue of law or of
fact, as many issues as there were lines.
A second exceptional situation was presented when a plaintiff sued
two or more persons as joint defendants. As each defendant was alss STEPHEN, PLEADING, 3d Am. ed., 262 (1924); SHIPMAN, PLEADING, 3d ed.,
418 (1923); 3 HoLnswoRTH, H1sToRY OF THE ENGLISH LAw 631 (1923); 9 id.
291 (1926).
84
Supra, at note 83.
85
STEPHEN, PLEADING, 3d Am. ed., 267 (1924); SHIPMAN, PLEADING, 3d ed.,
425 (1923).
~~ STEPHEN, PLEADING, 3d Am. ed., 258 (1924); SHIPMAN, PLEADING, 3d ed.,
419 (1923).
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lowed to defend separately/1 there might be as many lines of pleading,
and, therefore, as many issues, as there were defendants.
The common-law scheme of limiting every action to a single issue
collapsed finally because of the unfairness involved in restricting a
defendant to one defense. One relaxation came by allowing the defendant to plead broad general denials (issues) which permitted the proof
of more than one defense. Another relaxation came by an act of Parliament passed in I 70 5 which authorized the defendant, with leave of the
court, to plead to one claim as many defenses as he might have.88 This
statute did not, however, permit double pleading at any stage later than
the plea. With respect to one daim the number of lines of pleading
was governed by the number of defenses. As the statute did not apply
to pleas in abatement, the old rules continued to prohibit more than one
plea in abatement to the same matter at the same time. The old rules,
also, continued to prohibit the joinder of a plea in abatement with a
plea in bar, and the raising of an issue of law and an issue of fact with
respect to the same matter at the same time.
( b) In eq.ztity. In equity a defendant might meet the plaintiff's
statement of claim by a plea or by answer. If he chose to meet it by
plea he was required to limit his plea to one affirmative matter or to one
denial so as to reduce the cause to a single point.89 Although the courts
of equity were "anxious to preserve some analogy to the comparative
simplicity of proceedings at the common law," 00 they never undertook
to limit a suit to a single point if the defendant was willing to put in an
answer as distinguished from a plea.
(c) Under the codes. By allowing as many defenses to each claim
as the defendant might have and as many replies to an affirmative
defense as a plaintiff might have, the writers of the original New York
code (1848) clearly repudiated the common-law scheme of limiting
every action to a single issue. They did not, however, expressly provide
that an issue of fact and an issue of law might be raised at the sai;ne
time with respect to the same matter. Due to this omission, the com- ·
mon-law rule is still followed under the codes, except in a few states
where the raising of the two issues has been expressly authorized. 01
~

87

STEPHEN, PLEADING,

3d Am. ed., 246 (1924);

424 (1923).
'

88
89

4 Anne, c. 16 (1705).
Note 56, supra.

'271 (1838).
350 (1928).

DO STORY, EQUITY PLEADINGS,§

91

CLARK, ConE PLEADING

SHIPMAN, PLEADING,

3d ed.,
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The general code practice in this respect has been characterized by
Hepburn as a "remarkable survival" of a common-law restriction.02
(d) Under the federal rules. The federal rules (1938) follow the
practice of the exceptional code states in allowing issues of law and of
fact to be raised at the same time to the same matter.93 In these jurisdictions the last vestige of the celebrated common-law scheme has disappeared. Any limit on the scope of an action comes, not from rules
which purport to limit the number of issues, but from rules which purport to limit the action's affirmative scope.

B. Issues Formed by Evidence
Under the common law it was necessary to file successive pleadings
until issues of law or of fact were reached on all branches of the case.
Special names were given to the pleadings through seven stages of
pleading on the assumption that some lines of pleading might extend
that far. 94 Most codes, cQJnmencing with the New York code of 1848,96
limit pleadings to three stages-complaint, answer, and reply. If new
matter is set up in the reply, no issue of fact is reached by the pleadings.
"But the allegation of new matter in a reply, shall not in any respect
conclude the defendant, who may on the trial avail himself of any valid
objection to its sufficiency, or may countervail it by proofs, either in
direct denial or by way of avoidance." 96 The federal rules (1938)
allow only two stages of pleading-unless otherwise ordered by the
court.97 "Averments in a pleading to which no responsive pleading is
required or permitted shall be taken as denied or avoided." 08 Issues of
fact which might, but for the limited number of pleading stages, be
formed by pleadings can be formed by the evidence in the course of the
trial.
As pointed out at the beginning of Part II of this discussion, claims
and defenses not pleaded cannot be proved unless the point is waived.
It happens not infrequently that a party will plead one claim or defense
and then undertake to prove a somewhat different one. If instead of
objecting to this evidence, the opposing party forms an issue by intro92

HEPBURN, THE H1sTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF ConE PLEADING 240 (1897).
See Form No. 20.
94
The names were: declaration, plea, replication, rejoinder, surrejoinder, rebutter,
and surrebutter.
96
N. Y. Code (1848), § 132.
96 Id., § 144.
97
Federal Rule 7 (a).
98
Federal Rule 8 (d).
93
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,

· ducing opposing evidence, the issue thus formed -is properly within the
scope of the action. 99 Some courts, however, require that the pleadings
be aI)lended to conform to the proof before an issue thus forme,d will be
decided. 100
'
·
C. Questions Not Waived
I. At common law. In so far as the parties controlled the matter
by their pleadings, a single issue of law or of fact was the minimum
trial scope of a civil ac,tion. It must be observed, however, that certain
questions of law were involved in every action whether raised by the
pleadjngs or not. Discussing writs of error, Stephen said:
" ... the most frequent case of error is when, upon the face of
the record, the judges appear to have committed a mistake in law.
This may be by having wrongly decided an issue in law brought
before them by demurrer, but it may also happen in other ways.
As formerly stated, the judgment will in general follow success
in the issue. It is, however, a principle necessary to be understood,
in order to have a right apprehension of the nature of writs of
error, that the judges are, in contemplation of law, bound, before
in any case they give judgment, to examine the whole record, and
then to adjudge either for the::: plaintiff or defendant, according to
the legal right as it may on the whole appear, notwithstanding, or
without regard to, the issue in law or fact that may have been
raised and decided between the parties." 101
A striking' illustration of the principle stated by Stephen is found
in the case of default. Even though the defendant fails to appear, the
court, before it may enter judgment for the plaintiff~ must' find (I)
that it has jurisdiction over the person of the defendant; 102 ( 2) that the
plaintiff's claim is sufficient in law; 103 and (3) that the court has jurisdiction of the class of claims to which the plaintiff's claim belongs. 104
If the plaintiff seeks damages, the court, or some agency acting for it,
must determine the amount of the damages.105
Another illustration of the principle stated by Stephen is found in ,
99

Hansen v. Kline, 136 Iowa IOI, 113 N. W. 504 (1907). Also see 2 BANCROFT,
CODE PRACTICE AND REMEDIES,§ 1488 (1927).
100
Budd v. Hoffheimer, 52 Mo. 297 (1873). In Schwaninger v. E. J. McNeeley & Co., 44 Wash. 447, 87 P. 514 (1906), the court held that pleadings are
"deemed" amended to conform to proof.
101
STEPHEN, PLEADING, 3d Am. ed., 143-144 (1924).
102
6 ENCYC. PLEADING & PRACTICE 24 ( I 896).
103 Id. 45.
104 [d. 45 .
. 105 Id. 132.
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the common-law practice, still followed, of "searching the record." 106
If a party at one of the later pleading stages challenges a pleading as
insufficient in law, the court, instead of examining the pleading attacked,
examines the plaintiff's statement of claim to see if it is sufficient in law.
If it is not, the court orders that the defendant have judgment. If the
plaintiff's claim is found sufficient, the court then examines the defendant's defense to see if it is sufficient in law. If it is not, the court
orders that the plaintiff have judgment. If the defense, too, is sufficient,
the court examines the reply, and so on until it reaches the pleading
which was expressly attacked. Under this practice, there are as many
questions of law as there are pleadings in the line up to and including
the one attacked or found insufficient in law.
From the viewpoint of a judgment fpr the defendant, an action may
consist of a single question. If, for example, the court finds that it has
no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, it may dismiss the action without considering any other question. Where the plaintiff sues
on a single claim and the defendant appears, the court may enter judgment for the defendant by finding either that the plaintiff's claim is
insufficient in law or that the court has no jurisdiction of the class of
claims to which the plaintiff's claim belongs. A pleading raising one of
these questions, or challenging the jurisdiction of the court over the
person of the defendant, limits the scope of the action, from the viewpoint of a judgment for the defendant, to a single question.
From the viewpoint of a judgment for the plaintiff, an action cannot be limited by pleadings to a single question. Even where the defendant has appeared and there can be no question as to jurisdiction
over his person, the court, before it may enter judgment for the
plaintiff, must "in contemplation of law'' find: (I) That the plaintiff's
claim is sufficient in law, and ( 2) that the court has jurisdiction of this
class of claims. Whether these questions are raised by the pleadings or
not, they constitute from the plaintiff's viewpoint. the minimum trial
scope of a civil action. -If other questions are raised, the trial scope is
expanded accordin:gly.
In equity. After pointing out that "It is obvious that every Bill
must have for its object one or more of the grounds, upon which the
jurisdiction of a Court of Equity is founded," Story wrote:

2:

"But, whatever may be the object of the Bill, the first and fundamental rule, which is always indispensable to be observed, is,
106

STEPHEN, PLEADING,

284 (1923).

3d Am. ed., 106 (1924);

SHIPMAN, PLEADING,

3d er

280
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that it must state a case within the appropriate jurisdiction of a
Court of Equity. If it fails in this respect, the error is fatal at
every stage of the cause, and can never be cured by any waiver or
course of proceeding by the parties...." 101
3. Unde.r the codes. The original New York code· (r848) provided that if certain objections should not be taken either by demurrer
or by answer, "the defendant" shall be deemed to have waived the
same, excepting only the objection to the jurisdiction of the court over
the subject of the action; and the objection that the complaint does not
state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action." 108 By making these
exceptions the code writers preserved the common-law principle set
forth above.
4. Under the federal rules•. The federal rules (r938) provide:
"A party waives all defenses and objections which he does not
present either by motion ... or ... in his answer or reply, except
( r) that the defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted ... may also be made by a later pleading, if one is
permitted, or by motion for judgment on the pleadings or at the
trial on the merits, and except ( 2) that, whenever it appears by
suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action." 100
It thus appears that if a judgment for the plaintiff is to be sustained
in any civil action, whether at comm~n law, in equity, under the codes,
or under the federal rules, it must appear from the record ( r) that the
plaintiff's claim is one which the law recognizes, and ( 2) that the court
has jurisdiction of the class of claims to which his claim belongs.

D. Questions of Trial Procedure
In the courst: of a trial, especially in the course of a trial of issues
of fact, questions may arise as to the order of proceeding, admissibility
of evidence, etc. As these questions cannot be raised by pleadings in
advance of the trial, they are outside the scope of the action as expressly fixed by the pleadings, but within tlie scope of the action as
developed at the trial.

E. Collateral Issues
According fo Wigmore, two classes of facts are not 'collateral: (a)
facts relevant to the issues; (b) facts discrediting a witness with respect
STORY, EQUITY PLEADINGS, § IO (1838).
N. Y. Code (1848), § 127.
109 Federal Rule 12 (h). See I MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, § 12.10 (1938).
107

108
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to bias, skill, knowledge, etc.110 Although not directly revelant to the
issues formed by the pleadings, the matters mentioned , in (b) are
classified as noncollateral so that issues with respect to them can be
formed at the trial. In the law of evidence the rule against collateral
issues is based on the idea that a trial must, for practical reasons, be kept
within certain bounds.

F. Consolidation
When two or more actions for claims which might have been
joined are pending in the same court, the court in its discretion may
order that they be consolidated into one action. This procedure, developed at common law,111 is permitted under most of the codes,112
and unaer the federal rules. 113 As, ordinarily, the claims must be joinable, the rule permitting consolidation does not extend the maximum
potential scope of civil actions, but merely provides a method for determining the actual scope of an action at the stage of the trial.

III
JUDGMENT SCOPE

A. Matters Admitted By Pleadings
A matter of claim or defense admitted by the pleadings, either expressly or by failure to deny, is not within the scope of the tdal, but
appears of record and is within the scope of the judgment. It is res
judicata.
·
B. Matters Determined By Trial
Issues formed by the pleadings or in the course of the trial are determined by the trial. The results of the trial of direct issues, as distinguished from collateral issues and questions of trial procedure, are
placed upon the record and form a part of the basis of the judgment.
They are within the scope of the action at the stage of the judgment.
They are res judicata.
3 WtGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §§ 1004, 1005 (1934).
GOULD, A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING IN CIVIL ACTIONS, 3d
ed., 221 (1849).
112
CLARK, CODE PLEADING 334 (1928).
113
Federal Rule 42 (a). Under this rule consolidation is permitted of "actions
involving a common question of law or fact." See 3 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, §
42.01 (1938).
110

111
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C. Claims And Defenses Not Made
r. Claims not made. Claims not made in a particular action are
not, ordinarily, within the scope of that action. For a claim not made
to be within the scope of an· action it must be one which the party is
required to make in the particular action on the penalty of losing it.
Such a claim is concluded by the judgment in the action although it
does not appear in the record of the case.
Where claims are required to be made, the minimum judgment
scope of the action is the total number of claims made and not made.
Four illustrations of this principle appear above: ( r) compulsory counterclaims under ·the federal rules; (2) claims in proceedings in rem;
(3) claims of persons represented in class suits, and (4) claims of persons interpleaded.114
Another illustration of the principle referred to is the so-called
"splitting'' of a "cause of action." 115 If a person has a claim against
another and sues on a "part" of that claim, he cannot in later action sue
on another "part," as only one action is allowed on one claim. An objection on the ground of splitting cannot be made in the first action because
the "part" of the claim set up has all the substantive elements of a valid
claim. The objection must be made in the second action on the ground
of res judicata.
·
A similar problem is presented when a plaintiff fails to ask for some
of the relief to which he is entitled, and, later, brings an action for that
relief. Or, when a defendant uses a claim as a defense and, later, attempts to make it the basis of an action. Also, when a plaintiff having
two claims for one relief sets up orie claim and, after failing to recover,
sets· up the other.
The anomalous practice of considering that certain claims are within
the scope of an action and concluded by the judgment without an express requirement that they be included in the action may be traced
either to failure on the part of the codes and the federal rules to fix the
maximum scope of a "cause of action" or "claim," or to failure to in114 Notes 41, 49, 50, 51. In certain special proceedings claimants must make their
claims or lose them, daims in bankruptcy being the most familiar illustration. For a
discussion of this problem in the field of estates of decedents, see comment, 41 MrcH.
L. REv. 920 (1942). A discussion of the principle in respect to proceedings to limit
the liability of shipowners will be found in The Panuco, (D. C. N. Y. 1942) 47 F.
Supp. 249.
·
115
CLARK, ConE PLEADING, 3 18 ( 1928); PHILLIPS, CoDE PLEADING, 2d ed., §
201 (1932).
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elude in the procedural scherp.e a provision requiring the joinder of
certain claims. In view of the strong disagreements which have resulted
from attempts to define "cause of action," the present writer suggests
that attempts to fix the maximum scope of the secondary unit be abandoned, and that the problem be approached from the viewpoint of compulsory joinder.
Without attempting to give the exact language of a provision for
compulsory joinder of claims, the writer suggests that the codes and
new federal rules be amended so as to require joinder of all claims
which arise from the same transaction or occurrence, or which involve
common questions of law or fact. 116
116

Claims which arise out of the same transaction or occurrence ordinarily involve
common questions of law or fact. Even in the exceptional instances joinder would
effect some saving in time, labor, and expense. On the other hand, claims not arising
out of the same transaction or occurrence may, in some instances, involve common questions. Unless both requirements are made in the alternative, it seems desirable to adopt
the less scientific, but more simple, rule that claims arising out of the same transaction
or occurrence must be joined. In the following illustrations the common questions approach will be referred to as Rule One; the same transaction or occurrence approach
will be referred to as Rule Two.
Torts: Both rules would require joinder of a claim for personal injury with one
for injury to property where both injuries were caused by the same tortious act (e.g.,
where person and property were injured in a collision of automobiles). The same result would follow where injuries by one tortious act (e.g., nuisance) were to tracts of
land held by separate titles; and where several items of personal property were taken at
one time. Also, where husband and wife were injured by one act and the husband has
a claim for his own injuries and for the loss of his wife's services. Claims for repeated
trespasses on the same tract of land would have to be joined under Rule One if a
common question (e.g., claimant's possession or defendant's right to enter) would be
involved. Claims for repeated libels or slanders would have to be joined under Rule
One as it is very probable that a common question (viz., truth) would be involved. A
claim for an assault and one for slanderous words spoken at the same time would not
il!volve common questions, but would have to be joined under Rule Two. Where
claimant alleges one set of facts, (e.g., negligence causing personal injury) and claims
on two or more legal theories (e.g., common law, state liability act, and federal liability
act), he must join his claims under both rules. The rules under consideration would not,
however, require the joinder of a claim for injuries causing death and a claim under
the death act, if the claimant holds \he claims in different capacities and is considered
two persons.
Contracts: The proposed rules would not aid in determining whether a breach of
a contract should be considered as an entire breach or merely as one of several breaches,
each of which may be made the basis of a claim. Where several breaches of one contract have occurred they can be considered as merged into one claim or can be considered as claims which should be joined under both rules. Where claims are based on
separate contracts made as parts of one transaction ( e.g., a series of notes secured by one
mortgage or coupons attached to one bond), they would have to be joined under Rule
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The rule indicated would not take care of all of the problems of
res judicata referred to above, but would eliminate the troublesome
doctrine of "splitting'' and would serve as a simple and rational basis
for holding that claims of the types mentioned are within the scope of
the action whether pleaded or not and are concluded by the judgment.
The federal provision for compulsory counterclaims is a step in the
right direction.
2. Defenses not made. A defendant who has a claim which is also
a de.fense is not requi~ed to use it either as a counterclaim ( except where
compulsory by statute or court rule) or as a defense, but may make
it the basis of a later action. 117 A defendant may not, however, fail to
make use of a defense and later use it as a means of upsetting a judgment against him.118 It has been said that "a defendant is bound to
make as many ,defenses as he has, and cannot make a defense in a subsequent suit which he ·might have made in a former one." 119 From
this it appears that defenses which can be made in an action, but are not
made, are nevertheless within the scope of the action and concluded by
the judgment.
. D. Questions Not Waived
All questions not raised by pleadings or at the trial are waived except ( r) legal insufficiency of a claim, defense, or reply; ( 2) want of
jurisdiction over the class of claims to which the plaintiff's claim belongs. In rendering the judgment the court, "in contemplation of law,"
decides these questions. This explains the practice of allowing these
questions to be raised "for the first time" on appeal. Whether expressly raised or not, these ql;lestions are within the scope of the action
and are determined by the judgment.
Two; and also under Rule One if any question should be raised which would affect
the entire series.
·
Several kinds oj relief: Where from a single set of facts two or more claims for
relief are made (e.g., abatement of nuisance, damages, and injunction) these claims
would have to be joined under both rules. The proposed rules would require the
joinder of a claim for reformation of a contract with one for its enforcement. A claim
for a debt and to enforce a lien given to secure it would have to be joined.
Alternative claims: The proposed rules would require the joinder of alternative
claims, such as a claim for breach of contract or for amount promised as compromise
settlement. A claim for possession of property on which the defendant has erected a
wall would have to be joined with a claim, in the alternative, that the defendant be
required to remove the wall.
117
Watkins v. American Nat. Bank of Denver, (C. C. A. 8th, 1904) 134 F. 36.
118
Covington & Cincinnati Bridge Co. v. Sargent, 27 Ohio St. 233 (1875).
119
Mengert v. Brinkerhoff, 67 Ohio St. 472 at 489, 66 N. E. 530 (1903).
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IV
ScoPE DETERMINATION

A. Pleading Techniques
I. Pleading the Elements of Claims and Defenses
(a) Substance. The various systems of procedure referred to in this
paper-common-law, equity, code, and federal-agree in requiring
that claims and defenses be stated in writing in advance of trial. They
further agree in requiring that all claims and defenses as stated be
legally sufficient in substance. For a court to be able to determine from
a written statement whether a claim or defense is substantially sufficient
it is necessary that the statement mention in some form all the substantive elements of the claim or defense. 120 Because of the importance
attached to this requirement it may be called the basic rule of pleading.
At another point rules of pleading involve substantive law. Ordinarily the burden of proof follows the burden of pleading.121 To the
extent that this is true, rules which determine whether a matter must
be stated as an element in the plaintiff's claim or pleaded by the defendant as a defense are concerned not merely with the manner of
stating claims and defenses, but with the substantive matter of allotting
the burden of proof.
(b) Form. Formal headings, commencements, conclusions, etc.
are useful in the sense that any label or identifying mark is useful, but
otherwise have little or no significance. The same is true of separate
statements of claims and defenses, and the putting of allegations in
separate paragraphs. The form in which the substantive elements of a
claim or defense are mentioned is not important, but has been made
important in code states by the code requirement that a party set forth
the "facts" which constitute his "cause of action" or "defense." This
requirement has led to elaborate considerations of the meaning of
"facts," accompanied by vain attempts to distinguish between (a) evidentiary facts, (b) ultimate facts, and ( c) legal conclusions. The difficulties which arose from the code requirement led the draftsmen of
the federal rules (1938) to avoid the use of the word "facts" and to
120
This general statement is subject to a rule which dispenses with the statement of matters of which the court takes judicial notice. Under this exception the law
applicable to the case need not be stated expressly. As the matters stated must be stated
in relation to the law, the law is "understood" and is, in this sense, included in the
pleading.

121

CLARK, CooE PLEADING 418 (1928).
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require merely that claims and defenses be stated in language which is
"simple, concise, and direct." 122
( c} Detail. In the schemes of procedure under consideration, the
stating of a claim or defense in the abstract is never permitted. Certain
factual details, such as time, place, and descriptions of property, have
always been required. Under this rule jt is not enough to allege that the
law confers certain rights or that the party has a certain right. Factual
details showing that the claim or defense actually exists in the realm
· of fact are generally required .. Certain other factual details must be
pleaded merely as notice of what will be proved at the trial.
The nearest approach to the statement of a claim in the abstract
was the common-law pleading of general assumpsit. This general type
of pleading was allowed when the plaintiff could describe his claim
without mentioning an express contract. If he had to refer to an express
contract he was,required to go farther and describe the contract in some
detail. Pleading in this general way has continued under the code,128
and is now allowed under the federal rules (1938).124
Another general type of pleading at common law was the action for
damages based on negligence. A plaintiff might state a claim on this
ground without specifying in detail the nature of the negligence. Today the details must be stated in many jurisdictions.125 Under the
federal rules (1938) 'negligence need not be specified in detail unless
required by the court.126
Details of special, as distinguished from general, damage must be
specified in order to give notice.
One reason for requiring factual detail is to give each substantive
element of claim or defense an appearance of factual existence so its
truth may be denied and an issue of fact formed, if desired. Another,
is to give notice of matters which, if proved without notice, might take
the opposite party by surprise.

Forming Issues of !,aw and of Fact
(a) Issues of law. :At common law a party might demur on the
ground that a pleading of an opposing party was defective in substance
2.

Fed~ral Rule 8 (e) (1). See I MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, § 8.07 (1938).
CLARK, CoDE PLEADING 196 (1928).
124
See Forms 4 to 8.
125
CLARK, CoDE PLEADING 207 (1928).
126 See Forms 9 and IO, "Indeed, it is interesting to see how the true commonlaw pleading had ••• a simple system of direct allegation which is even now the basis
of the federal forms of complaints in negligence and contract.•••" Clark, "Simplified
Pleading," A. B. A. JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION MONOGRAPH No. 18, p. 6 (1941).
122
123
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or in form. A demurrer for a defect in form had to point out specially
the defect complained of. If an issue of law raised by a demurrer was
the only issue, its decision determined the entire case, unless the losing
party was allowed to amend or plead over. This was due to the rule
that a party could not raise an issue of law and of fact to the same
matter at the same time. When a party demurred he was taken to
have admitted the truth of the opposing party's pleading by failing
to deny it. If he lost on the demurrer, all was lost unless the court
would allow him to plead again. A similar result followed when a demurrer was sustained. If the court would not allow the pleading found
defective to be amended, judgment was entered for the attacking party.
The common-law scheme has continued under the codes as to some
defects both of substance and of form. 121 As to others, motions must be
used.128 The federal rules (1938) 129 and the statutes or court rules of
some states 180 have abolished demurrers, requiring that all issues of law
be raised by motion or by answer.
(b) Issues of fact. When a necessary matter alleged as a substantive element of a claim or defense is denied specifically, the denial is
called a specific denial. While it is permissible to deny all the elements
specifically, the denial of any one is a c~mplete answer, for if an issue
thus formed is decided in favor of the denying party the claim or defense is defeated entirely. A general denial is one which denies the
truth of all matters properly alleged by an opposing party as the substantive elements of his claim or defense. At common law such a plea
was called a general issue.181 Some general issues were true general
denials. Some denied more than one but not all of the substantive elements of a claim. Others denied all elements but also opened the way
for the proof of certain affirmative matters. Under the codes and under
the federal rules (1938) a general denial is a true or logical general
denial.
. 3. Separate Statement of Claims
(a) At common law. At common law the plaintiff was required to
state each distinct claim in a separate count. He was permitted to state
one claim in several counts with slight changes in factual detail or legal
121

CLARK, CooE PLEADING 354, 358 (1928).
Id. 374.
129
Federal Rule 7 (c). See I MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, § 7.03 (1938).
18
CLARK, CooE PLEADING 371 (1928); Pike, "Objections to Pleadings under
the New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure," 47 YALE L. J. 50 (1937).
131
STEPHEN, PL~ADING, 3d Am. ed., 168 (1924); SHIPMAN, PLEADING, 3d ed.,
304 (1923).
12s

°
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theory as a means of pleading in the alternative. This practice of multiplying counts became one of the objectionable complexities of the common-law system. 13:a
(b) In equity. The count system was not employed in the courts
of equity.. A bill might have a "double aspect," 138 but was not repeated
as many times as there were "aspects."
(c) Under the codes. The coc;les commonly provide that each
"cause of action" must be separately stated and numbered. 134 In applying this rule it is necessary for the court to determine whether· a division of a pleading contains one "cause of action" or more than one. If
it states a single invasion of ( or threat to invade) a single right, the
answer is easy~ If it states two or more invasions 0£ one right, or the
· invasion of two or more rights on the same occasion, the answer becomes
difficult because of the failure of the codes to fix the maximum scope of
the secondary unit. If the codes should be amended to require the
joinder of claims arising out of the same transaction or occurrence or
involving common questions, they should be amended further to permit the pleading of the joined claims in the same count. The making
of these two changes will eliminate most of the problems which have
resulted from the failure of the codes and the courts to give an adequate definition of "cause of action."
(d) Under the federal rules. Rule IO of the new federal rules
(1938) provides that "Each claim founded upon a separate transaction
or occurrence . . . shall be stated in a separate count . . . whenever a
separation facilitates the clear presentation of the matters set forth." In
applying this rule it is not necessary for the court to determine in all
instances whether the division contains only one "claim" or more than
one. Some of the objections to the code provision are thus avoided.

B. Trial Techniques
i. Motions. Questions not waived (Subdivision II, C, supra) and
some questions of trial procedure (Subdivision II, D, supra) may be
raised by oral motions made in the course of the trial. Resistance by
argument forms the issue which the court decides.
2. Offer and objection. Questions .as to the admissibility of evidence are usually raised by offers of evidence resisted by objections.
182

CLARK, CODE PLEADING

183

STORY, EQUITY PLEADINGS,

iH CLARK, CoDE PLEADING

§ 3zo (193z).

314 (1928).
§ z54 (1838).
31z (19z8); PHILLIPS,

CoDE PLEADING,

zd ed.,
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Objections to argument of counsel must be accompanied by appropriate motions.
3. Introduction of evidence. Some issues are raised tacitly by the
introduction of evidence. If evidence comes in without objection and is
met by countervailing evidence, an issue different from that raised by
the pleadings may be formed. Where the series of pleadings stops
short of issue, the issue is formed by introducing evidence.

V
MINIMIZING SHAM SCOPE

A. Specific denials. The Michigan Court Rules (r933) abolished
the general issue and provided that every answer shall contain an "explicit admission or denial of each allegation in the declaration or bill of
complaint of which the defendant has knowledge or belief." 135 A similar practice was established in Illinois in 1933.186 The Michigan rules
further provide: "In connection with every denial, the answer shall set
forth the substance of the matters which will be relied upon to support
such denial." The commission which recommended the Michigan rules
believed that the "specific answer in equity is much more effective as a
means of developing and disclosing the real points in dispute than common law pleas," and that the requirement of support for denials has
"great possibilities for disclosing meritorious defenses and exposing
fictitious defenses." 137 Regardless of one's view as to the merits of
these devices, it must be recognized that the ease of putting in general
denials has led to the forming of countless sham issues of fact. The
scope of an action should be limited to matters which are honestly in
dispute between the parties.
B. Verification. Sworn answers were required ,in equity,138 but not
at common law except in pleas in abatement.189 The original New York
code ( r 848) required that all pleadings, with certain exceptions, be
verified.140 This was changed in r849 to provide that if one party shall
verify a pleading, all subsequent pleadings must be verified.141 Some
Michigan Court Rules (1931), No. 23, § 2.
Ill. Stat. Ann (Smith-Hurd, 1936), c. I IO, § 164.
187
See notes to Michigan Court Rule 23, § 2, MICHIGAN CoURT RULES ANNOTATED (1930) (University of Michigan Press).
188
STORY, EQUITY PLEADINGS, § 874 (1838); CLEPHANE, EQUITY PLEADING.
AND PRACTICE 301 (1926).
189
O'DONNELL, COMMON-LAW PLEADING 193 (1934).
140
N.Y. Code (1848), § 133.
141
N.Y. Laws (1849), c. 438, § 157.
135

186
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of the present codes follow the scheme of I 848; others, that of I 849.142
Under the federal rules (r938) pleadings need not be verified "except
when otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute." 148 The code
commissioners of New Yark ( I 848) believed that verification of all
pleadings was essential to "good faith in pleading and honest issues." 144
C. Certificates of counsel. The federal rules (r938) provide:
". . . The signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by
him that he has read the pleading; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to support it;
and that it is not interposed for delay. If a pleading is not signed
or is signed with intent to defeat the purpose of this rule, it may
be stricken as sham and false and the action proceed as though the
pleading had not been served. For a wilful violation of this rule
an attorney may be subject to appropriate disciplinary action." 145
This provision is a new device intended to prevent, principally, sham
denials. Its success will depend on the vigor with which it is enforced.
D. Motions to strike. The statutes of some of the code states
provide:
"Sham . . . answers, defenses, or replies . . . may on motion
be stricken out, or judgment rendered notwithstanding the same,
as for want of answer or reply." 146

In Minnesota this procedure has been developed into an effective
method of detecting and eliminating sham issues of fact. 147
' E-. Summary judgments. Under the summary judgment statutes
a party, after supporting his own position by a preliminary showing of
evidence, may call upon an opposite party to support his position by a
preliminary showing of ev1dence.148 If such a showing is not made when
required, the court may at once enter judgment for the moving party.
This procedure is designed to expose sham claims and defenses, particularly sham denials. It is a highly effective method of eliminating
sham issues of fact.
142 CLARK, CoDE PLEADING 143 (1928); PHILLIPS, CoDE PLEADING, 2d ed., §
307 (1932).
148 Federal Rule I I . See I MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, § II.or (1938).
144
CLARK, CoDE PLEADING 143 (1928).'
145 Federal Rule I I . See I MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, § II.OJ (1938).
146
CLARK, CoDE PLEADING 378 (1928); PHILLIPS, CoDE PLEADING, 2d ed.,
§ 442 (1932).
147
See Neefus v. Neefus, 209 Minn. 495, 296 N.W. 579 (1941).
148 Clark, "Summary Judgments," A. B. A. JumcIAL ADMINISTRATION MoNoGRAPH No. 5, p. 12, Bibliography (1941). For summary judgments under the 1938
federal rules (Rule 56), see--3 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, c. 56 (1938).
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F. Pretrial conferences. Another recently developed method of
detecting and eliminating sham issues of fact is the pretrial conference.149 One of the principal objects of the conference is to simplify
and formulate the issues in the case.150 In this intimate conference between attorneys and judge an attorney is not likely to insist on a denial
which he knows is sham, especially if the judge calls for a limitation of
the issues to matters which are fairly in dispute between the parties.
G. Costs. The court rules of Michigan adopted in 1933 provide:

"If it shall appear at the trial that any fact denied by pleading
ought not to have been denied, and the same is proved or admitted at the trial, the actual and reasonable expense of proving
or preparing to prove the same, including a reasonable counsel fee
for the time and attention devoted thereto, to be ascertained and
summarily taxed as the trial, shall be paid by the party making
such denial." 151
This rule, if vigorously enforced, will discourage, but of course, will
not prevent, sham issues of fact.
CoMMENTS AND CoNCLUSIONs

I. In the foregoing analysis, the writer has undertaken to show
that all rules commonly called rules of pleading may be classified
either as rules of scope-limitation ( rules which declare what may or
must be included in a civil action) or as rules of scope-determination
( rules which direct how the included matters shall be stated). The
latter are usually thought of when the term pleading is used. The vice
of classifying rules of scope-limitation as rules of pleading has been the
tendency to emphasize the manner of stating claims and defenses, instead of concentrating attention on the scope of the trial.
2. From the brief historical data presented in connection with the
analysis it appears that the outer boundaries (maximum scope) of the
Anglo-American civil action have been gradually expanded. From a
period in which the common-law rules of scope-limitation had as their
great object the formation of a single issue, we have moved step by step
to a period in which there is a growing body of opinion to the effect
that the maximum scope of actions should not be fixed in advance by
statutes or by general rules, but should be left to the good sense of the
parties, subject to the control of the judge in the particular case. In the
149
Laws and Stockman, "Pre-Trial Conference," A.B.A. JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION MONOGRAPH No. 4, p. 18, bibliography (1941).
150 See Federal Rule 16; l MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, c. 16 (1938).
151
Michigan Court Rules (1931), No. 17, § IO.
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last fifty years the rules which govern "The Compass of the Cause"
have shown "conspicuous advance." 152
3. While the maximum scope of the action was gradually expanding the minimum scope remained substantially the same. There has
been, however, an increasing tendency to require that certain groups of
claims be treated as one claim to prevent a multiplicity of suits. Although developed as a part of the law of res judicata, the requirement is
dealt with in the law of pleading under the heading, "Splitting a
Cause of Action." It seems clear that the requirement is really one of
scope-limitation--one which increases the minimum scope of the action
in which it operates. Trial convenience dictates not only that certain
matters should not be tried together, but that ·certain matters should
be tried together to prevent a multiplicity of suits.
4. In order to give the requirement mentioned in (3) proper
recognition as a rule of scope-limitation and to eliminate the confusion
which results from attempts to deal with a "cause of action" of undefined maximum scope, the codes and new federal rules should be
amended to provide for the compulsory joinder of claims which arise
out of the same transaction or occurrence, or involve common questions
of law or fact.
5. In considering how simple or complex an action should be, attention is focused on the trial. Simple actions on the one hand and the
prevention of unnecessary actions on the other present conflicting aims
which must be compromised. The finding of the best middle ground is
not an academic exercise, nor is it a mere technicality of procedure. It
is a pressing problem of procedural policy.
152

Supra at note

1.

